The real options framework has been used extensively to analyze the timing of investment under uncertainty. The ability to defer decisions under evolving uncertainty provides the investor with a valuable option to wait. While real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference, there is substantial evidence that decision makers are very impatient about choices in the short-term, but are quite patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. We extend the real options framework to model the investment timing decisions of entrepreneurs with such time-inconsistent preferences. Two opposing forces determine investment timing: while evolving uncertainty induces investors to defer investment in order to take advantage of the option to wait, their present-biased preferences motivates them to invest earlier in order to avoid the time-inconsistent behavior they will display in the future. We find that the precise trade-off between these two forces depends on such factors as whether investors are sophisticated or naive about their future time-inconsistent behavior, as well as whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time. We extend the model to consider equilibrium investment behavior for an industry comprised of time-inconsistent entrepreneurs. Equilibrium involves the dual problem of agents playing dynamic games against others as well as against their own future selves.
Introduction
There is no doubt that people want to see the benefits from investment appear sooner rather than later. An entrepreneur seeking to strike it rich would certainly prefer to achieve success today rather than years in the future; mansions, yachts and fancy cars are not enjoyed until they materialize. However, what precisely is meant by impatience is not quite so obvious.
While the standard assumption that investors have a constant rate of time preference makes analytical solutions tractable, there is substantial evidence that individuals are very impatient about choices among outcomes in the short-term, but are quite patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. Such time-varying impatience, sometimes termed hyperbolic preferences, implies a time-inconsistency problem: the investment strategies that one would like to commit to in the future may prove suboptimal once the future arrives.
We model this problem by merging two important strands of research: the real options approach that emphasizes the benefits of waiting to invest in an uncertain environment, and the literature on hyperbolic preferences where decision makers face the difficult problem of making optimal choices in a time-inconsistent framework. The key question that this paper answers is: How do investors trade-off the benefits of waiting to invest in an uncertain environment with the costs of delegating investment decisions to yourself in the future, when your future decisions will deviate from those that would be optimal according to your current preferences? As an example, consider an entrepreneur facing the choice of when to invest in a new production technology, whose uncertain benefits evolve over time. On the one hand, standard real options models imply a large option value of waiting: typical parameterizations in the literature show that investment should not occur until the payoff is at least double the cost. On the other hand, given the investor's time-inconsistent preferences, he has an incentive to hurry his investment in order to avoid sub-optimal decisions made by himself in the future. Our model can show precisely how the entrepreneur will balance these two opposing forces. 1 The real options framework has proven to be a powerful and flexible approach for analyzing investment under uncertainty. In this paper, we consider a particularly well-suited application of the real options framework: the investment decision of an entrepreneur. The skills, experience and luck of the entrepreneur have endowed him with an investment opportunity in a risky project. By paying an irreversible investment cost I, the entrepreneur receives 1 In a different setting, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) also address some of the issues analyzed in this paper. Their paper looks at the choice of an individual with present-biased preferences as to when to take an action. However, their model is deterministic, and thus doesn't involve any of the issues of option timing that are endemic in the framework of investment under uncertainty. the value X(t) of a risky investment project. We assume that this investment option is nontradable (nor spanned by existing assets). This could be due to the fact that the option's value emanates from the special skills of the entrepreneur. Lack of tradability could also be due to asymmetric information in that the sale of the asset would result in a "lemons" problem. 2 Essentially, the real options approach posits that the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to an American call option on the investment project. Once that analogy is made, the vast and rigorous machinery of financial options theory is at the disposal of real investment analysis. Thus, the timing of investment is economically equivalent to the optimal exercise decision for an option. Since the seminal work of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) , the real options approach to investment under uncertainty has become an essential part of modern economics and finance. The real options approach is well summarized in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . 3 In the standard real options framework it is assumed that decision makers have a constant rate of time preference. Thus to account for impatience and investors' preferences to experience rewards sooner rather than later, real options models assume that rewards are discounted over time exponentially at a rate ρ. Such preferences are time-consistent in that an investor's preference for rewards at an earlier date over a later date is the same no matter when he is asked. However, virtually every experimental study on time preferences suggests that the assumption of time consistency is unrealistic. 4 When two rewards are both far away in time, decision makers act relatively patiently (e.g., they prefer two apples in 101 days, rather than one apple in 100 days). But when both rewards are brought forward in time, decision makers act more impatiently (e.g., they prefer one apple today, rather than two apples tomorrow). Laibson (1997) models such time-varying impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discount functions, where the discount rate declines as the horizon increases. Such preferences are also termed "present-biased" preferences by O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a). Applications of quasi-hyperbolic preferences are now quite extensive. 5 2 When perfect spanning does not exist, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) value real options as a private value derived via dynamic programming. 3 The application of the real options approach to investment is quite broad. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) use an option pricing approach to analyze investment in natural resources. McDonald and Siegel (1986) provided the standard continuous-time framework for analysis of a firm's investment in a single project. Majd and Pindyck (1987) enrich the analysis with a time-to-build feature. Dixit (1989) uses the real option approach to examine entry and exit from a productive activity. Titman (1985) and Williams (1991) use the real options approach to analyze real estate development. Grenadier (1996 Grenadier ( , 2002 and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) extend real options to a game-theoretic environment. 4 See Thaler (1981) , Ainslie (1992) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) . 5 For some examples, see Barro (1999) for an application to the neoclassical growth model, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) for a principal agent model, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) for contract design between firms and consumers, and Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) for asset pricing in an exchange economy.
In this paper we extend the real options framework to account for present-biased timeinconsistent preferences. We assume that the entrepreneur, when formulating his optimal investment timing decision, discounts distant future cash flows by a greater amount than current cash flows, due to his present-biased preferences. As is standard in models of timeinconsistent decision making, such problems are envisioned as the outcome of an "intrapersonal game" in which the same individual investor is represented by different players at future dates. That is, a "current self" formulates an optimal investment timing rule taking into account the investment timing rules chosen by "future selves." Essentially, the time-inconsistent investment problem is solved by jointly solving two interconnected value functions: the current self's value function and the future selves' value function. To solve this intra-personal game in a continuous-time stochastic environment, we employ the continuoustime model of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences in Harris and Laibson (2004) .
Just as in any game-theoretic equilibrium, when the investor formulates his optimal investment strategy, he will contemplate the investment strategies chosen by his future selves.
However, the literature on decision making under time-inconsistent preferences proposes two potential assumptions about the strategies chosen by future selves, both of which are considered in this paper. One assumption is that investors are "sophisticated" in that they correctly anticipate time-varying impatience, and thus assume that future selves will choose strategies that are optimal for future selves, despite being sup-optimal from the standpoint of the current self. This very rational assumption is in keeping the tradition of subgame perfect game-theoretic equilibrium, and is the approach followed by Laibson (1997) . An alternative assumption is that investors are "naive" in that they assume that future selves will act according to the preferences of the current self, and is the approach followed by Akerlof (1991) . The naive investor holds a belief (that proves incorrect) that his current self can commit future selves to act in a time-consistent manner. This assumption is in keeping with behavioral beliefs about over-confidence (in the ability to commit). In our model, we will analyze investment timing under both assumptions, and determine the impact of such behavioral assumptions on investment timing strategies.
We find that when the standard real options model is extended to account for timeinconsistent preferences, investment occurs earlier than in the standard, time-consistent framework.
However, the extent of this rush to invest depends on whether the timeinconsistent investor is sophisticated or naive. Specifically, we find that the naive investor rushes his investment less than does the sophisticated investor. Since the naive investor (falsely) believes that his future selves will invest according to his current wishes, he is not fearful of taking advantage of the option to wait. However, the sophisticated investor cor-rectly anticipates that his future selves will invest in a manner that deviates from his current preferences. This puts pressure on the sophisticated investor to extinguish his option to wait earlier, so as to mitigate some of the costs of allowing future selves to take over the investment decision. In a sense, if one views the time-consistent solution as somehow "optimal," the naive investor's false belief in the ability to commit to an investment strategy actually helps the investor get closer to optimality; self-delusion is somehow preferable to true self-awareness. 6 In the standard real options framework, it is inconsequential whether we consider the payoff from investment as the lump sum X(t), or as the right to a series of future cash flows p(t). The time-consistent investor simply uses the present value of the future cash flows as the payoff from investment. For example, if the entrepreneur is contemplating developing a real estate project, whether he considered the payoff as the present value of future rental earnings or as the value of the building, the investment timing decision would be exactly the same.
However, with time-inconsistent preferences, this is not the case. When we extend our model to the case of the option paying off via a perpetual series of cash flows, the implications on investment timing are much different from the case of a lump sum payoff. Again, we assume that if the payoff is given by a series of future cash flows, then the right to this series of future cash flows is non-tradable, for the same reasons as discussed earlier (e.g., the cash flow stream is dependent on the unique skills of the entrepreneur, or asymmetric information leads to a lemons problem). For the case of flow payoff, both the naive and sophisticated hyperbolic investors invest later than the time-consistent investor. The intuition for why hyperbolic investors wait longer before exercising than time-consistent investors for the case of flow payments is clear. While the time-consistent investor simply discounts the perpetual flow payments by ρ to obtain an equivalent lump sum payoff value, the hyperbolic investor discounts the payments received by future selves at a higher discount rate. This lowered payoff from exercise increases the value of the hyperbolic investor's option to wait. While it remains true that hyperbolic investors have an incentive to exercise before their future selves (particularly sophisticated investors), the previously mentioned effect dominates.
We later move beyond the analysis of an single investor's strategy and look at the equilibrium properties of investment. That is, how does equilibrium investment in an industry comprised of hyperbolic investors compare with one comprised of time-consistent investors?
Clearly, this is empirically relevant, and a problem that is somewhat of a technical chal-lenge. 7 Specifically, we look at the case of a perfectly competitive industry where investors choose rational expectations equilibrium investment strategies, using a framework similar to Leahy (1993) , where price-taking investors contemplate investing in project with perpetual flow payments. 8 It is noteworthy that agents are playing both an interpersonal and intrapersonal game: they play a game against other firms as well as future selves. The previously mentioned result from the case of a single investor with a flow payoff continues to hold: equilibrium investment occurs later for hyperbolic investors than for time-consistent investors.
Competition does not alter this timing result. In addition, unlike Leahy's (1993) result that for time-consistent investors the perfectly competitive equilibrium investment trigger is identical to the monopoly trigger, this is not true for hyperbolic discounters: In equilibrium sophisticated investors will invest earlier than had they been monopolists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the underlying model, and provides the solution for the benchmark time-consistent case. Section 3 derives the optimal investment strategy of the naive investor. Section 4 derives the optimal investment strategy of the sophisticated investor. Section 5 discusses the implications of preference assumptions on investment timing. Section 6 extends the model to include the case of investments that yield a series of cash flows. Section 7 considers the implications of our model in an equilibrium setting, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Setup of the Model
The Investment Opportunity
Consider the standard irreversible investment timing model of McDonald and Siegel (1986) .
The entrepreneur possesses an opportunity to invest in a project. The investment option is assumed to be non-tradable (nor spanned by existing assets). 9 Denoting the value process of the underlying project by X(t) and the investment cost by I, the payoff from investment is X(t) − I. The entrepreneur is free to choose the moment of exercise. 7 While in a very different context, Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) model an equilibrium of a discrete-time exchange economy with hyperbolic discount factors. 8 While we solve for the equilibrium comprised of sophisticated investors, we do not construct an equilibrium for the case of naive investors. This is due to the problematic nature of defining an equilibrium for naive investors. While the literature on naive hyperbolic preferences provides a well-defined notion of a current self's expectations regarding future selves' behavior (they incorrectly anticipate future selves to act according to the current self's preferences), there is no standard assumption regarding what they forecast for others' current and future selves. 9 Non-tradability may be justified on any of several grounds. For example, the option's value may be contingent upon the unique skills of the entrepreneur; the option may have little or no value in the hands of another investor. In addition, the investor may have private information about the option that cannot be credibly conveyed to outside purchasers, and hence a "lemons" problem may result.
Let the underlying project's value, X(t), evolve as a geometric Brownian motion process:
where α is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in X per unit time, σ is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit time, and dB is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
Investor Time Preferences
While we maintain the standard assumption from the real options literature of risk neutral utility, we dispense with the standard assumption of exponential discounting. In order to reflect the empirical pattern of declining discount rates, Laibson (1997) adopted a discretetime discount function to model quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Time is divided into two periods: the present period, and all future periods. All periods (the present and future) are discounted exponentially with the discount rate ρ. However, future periods are discounted by an additional factor δ ∈ (0, 1). For example, a dollar payment received at the end of the first period is discounted at the rate ρ and is thus worth exp(−ρ) today, but a payment received at the end of the n th period is worth δ exp(−ρn) today, for all n > 1. 10 To see the time-inconsistency implications of such time preferences, consider the choice between investing at time 1 to receive a payment of P 1 and investing at time 2 to receive a payment of P 2 . From the perspective of an investor at time 0, this represents a choice between exp(−ρ)P 1 and δ exp(−2ρ)P 2 . Thus, they will choose to receive P 1 at time 1 over receiving P 2 at time 2 if and only if P 1 > δ exp(−ρ)P 2 . However, from the perspective of the same investor at time 1, this represents a choice between P 1 and exp(−ρ)P 2 , and they will choose to invest at time 1 over time 2 if and only if P 1 > exp(−ρ)P 2 . Therefore, the agent at time 0 will view the relative choice between these two future investment timing choices differently than he will at time 1. The investor at time 0 would like to commit his future self to adopt his preference orderings, but is unable to do so.
For technical convenience, we follow Harris and Laibson (2004) to model hyperbolic discounting using a continuous-time formulation, which generalizes the previous formulation to allow each period to be a random period of time. Each self controls the exercising timing in the "present" but also cares about the utility generated from the exercise decisions of future selves. As in Harris and Laibson (2004) , the "present" may last for a random duration of time. Let t n be the time of "birth" for self n. Then, T n = t n+1 − t n is the lifespan for self n. For simplicity, we assume that the lifespan is exponentially distributed with parameter λ. Stated in another way, the birth of future selves is modeled as a Poisson jump process with intensity λ. That is, we may imagine a clock ticking at a constant intensity λ into the indefinite future. Before the clock ticks, we call the entrepreneur self 0. After the clock ticks for the first time, self 0 ends with the birth of self 1. When the clock ticks for the n th time at time t n , self n is born.
Given this stochastic arrival process for future selves, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting formulation discussed earlier easily applies. Specifically, in addition to the standard discounting at rate ρ, the current self values cash flows obtained after the birth of future selves by an additional discounting factor δ. Let D n (t, s) denote self n's intertemporal discount function: self n's value at time t of $1 received at the future time s. We thus have
for s > t and t n < t < t n+1 . When self n "dies" and self n + 1 takes over the investment timing decision, self n + 1 uses the discount function D n+1 .
The Time-Consistent Benchmark (The Standard Real Options Case)
As a benchmark, we briefly consider the case in which all cash flows are discounted at the rate ρ. That is, the hyperbolic preference parameter δ is set equal to one. Alternatively, time-consistent discounting can be modeled by setting the jump intensity λ to 0. Let V (X) denote the value of the option, where X is the current level of X(t). Using standard arguments (i.e., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) , V (X) must solve the differential equation:
Eq. (3) must be solved subject to appropriate boundary conditions. These boundary conditions serve to ensure that an optimal exercise strategy is chosen:
Here, X * is the value of X(t) that triggers exercise. The first boundary condition is the valuematching condition. It simply states that at the moment the option is exercised, the payoff is X * − I. The second boundary condition is the smooth-pasting or high-contact condition.
(See Merton, 1973 , for a discussion of the high-contact condition.) This condition ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen so as to maximize the value of the option. The third boundary condition reflects the fact that zero is an absorbing barrier for X(t). 11 The option value, V (X), and the exercise trigger, X * , are
and
where
3 The Naive Investor
The time-inconsistent investor's problem is solved by modeling it as an intrapersonal game, in which the current self makes decisions for the present period, and future selves make decisions during future periods. It is thus important to make an assumption regarding what the current self believes will be the preferences of future selves. In this section, we assume that entrepreneurs are naive in that they make current choices under the false belief that future selves will act in the interest of the current self. This assumption of naivete was first proposed by Strotz (1956) , and has been analyzed in Akerlof (1991) The current self, self 0, has preferences D 0 (t, s), as specified in (2) . Specifically, the current self discounts cash flows during his lifetime with the discount function exp(−ρt), and discounts cash flows received by future selves with the discount function δ exp(−ρt).
Given the time-inconsistent preferences, future self 1 will have the discount function D 1 (t, s), future self 2 will have the discount function D 2 (t, s), and so on. For the case of the naive investor, we assume that the naive investor believes that all future selves will act as if their discount function remains unchanged at D 0 (t, s). Essentially, the naive investor acts as if he can commit his future selves to behave according to his current preferences. Of course, in our model there is no actual commitment mechanism and thus his optimistic beliefs will prove incorrect. In the next section we will analyze the case of a sophisticated investor who correctly anticipates the time-varying discount function of future selves. However, we will sometimes see that such naive beliefs can in fact lead to better decisions than those obtained by the sophisticated investor.
Let N (X) denote the value of the naive investor's investment opportunity. At any time prior to the arrival of his future self, he may exercise the option and receive the payoff X − I. However, if the future self arrives prior to the option being exercised, the current self receives what is known as a continuation value: the present value of the payoff determined by the decisions of future selves. Let N c (X) denote the continuation value of the investment opportunity. By the standard arguments in real options analysis, 12 N (X) must solve the following differential equation:
where the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are given by
respectively, and where X Naive is the optimal trigger value at which the current self exercises.
Note from equation (8), the arrival of the future self (which occurs with intensity λ) causes the option to equal its continuation value, N c (X).
The continuation value for the naive investor N c (X) is simply δV (X), the time-consistent solution in (5) discounted by the hyperbolic discounting factor δ. To see this, note that the naive investor's future selves discount all future cash flows by the discount function δ exp(−ρt). Since the multiplicative constant δ simply lowers all payoffs by the same proportion, the future selves will act as time-consistent investors who discount at the constant rate ρ. Therefore, the naive current self foresees a continuation value of δV (X), and believes that all future selves will exercise at the time-consistent trigger X * . We assume for the moment that X Naive < X * , and will later verify this conjecture. Substituting N c (X)=δV (X) into (8), the pricing equation is
Solving (10) subject to boundary conditions (9) yields the value function and exercise trigger:
Note that the naive exercise trigger is expressed as a simple implicit function.
We now show that the naive investor exercises earlier than the time-consistent investor, verifying the assumption made above. A proof of this proposition appears in the appendix.
Proposition 1
The naive investor exercises earlier than the time-consistent investor, in that
The intuition is straightforward. While the future selves are assumed to exercise at the time-consistent trigger X * , the continuation value is discounted by the additional discount factor of δ. Since this makes the payoff from exercise from future selves less valuable to the current self than had he exercised himself, this provides an extra incentive to the current self to exercise before the future selves arrive. In real options terms, the current self has a less valuable option to wait than do future selves. The additional discounting for future selves lowers the standard option value of waiting, causing the investment threshold to be lower.
It is important to emphasize the "irrational expectations" of the naive entrepreneur.
When formulating his optimal exercise trigger X Naive , he truly believes that his future selves will exercise at the time-consistent trigger X * . However, once the future self arrives, the future self becomes a current self and will then choose the exercise trigger X Naive . It is all due to a mistaken belief that somehow the current self can commit his future selves to act according to his current preferences. Without a true commitment device, this is not possible.
The Sophisticated Investor
In this section, we analyze the investment timing strategy for the sophisticated entrepreneur who realizes that his preference is time inconsistent and also knows that he cannot commit to a pre-determined investment timing strategy. Unlike the naive investor, the sophisticated investor correctly foresees that his future selves will act according to their own preferences.
That is, self n makes his own decision based on self n's preferences, fully anticipating that all future self's will do likewise. This leads to time inconsistency in the policy rule. That is, self n and self n + 1 do not agree on the optimal investment timing strategy.
As we will see, the solution for the sophisticated investor is non-trivial. For illustrative purposes, we will begin this section with the simple case of a sophisticated investor with just three selves: the current self will live for two more periods. We then move on to the more complicated case of the investor with any finite number of selves N . This is analogous to the general case of an investor with a finite lifespan. Finally, we consider the more analytically tractable case of an investor with an infinite number of future selves. We will see that the case with an infinite number of selves is equal to the solution to the problem of an investor with N selves, where we take the limit as N approaches infinity.
A Model with Three Selves
The case of a sophisticated investor with three selves is the simplest one for bringing out the intuition of solving the time-inconsistent investment timing problem. Self 0 is the current self. At a future stopping time, he is replaced with self 1. Similarly, self 1 is replaced at a future stopping time by self 2. Self 2 will then live forever after. We solve this problem by backward induction.
Self 2's Problem
First, consider the optimization problem from self 2's perspective. Since there are no more future selves, self 2 faces a simple geometric discounting case. Thus, self 2 will exercise at the time-consistent trigger X * , and will have an option value of V (X), as derived in Section 2.3. Denoting self 2's trigger and option values by X S,2 and S 2 (X), respectively, where "S"
signifies "sophisticated," we have:
Self 1's Problem Self 1 now formulates his optimal exercise trigger X S,1 , taking into account that his future self will exercise at the trigger X S,2 = X * . However, because of self 1's hyperbolic preferences, he values the exercise cash flows achieved by self 2 at only δ of their future value. Self 1's problem is thus identical to that of the naive investor, solved in Section 3.
Therefore, self 1's value function S 1 (X) is given by
where the optimal trigger strategy solves the implicit function given by
Note that X S,1 < X S,2 , as demonstrated in Proposition 1.
Self 0's Problem
Now, we turn to the optimization problem for self 0. Self 0 will choose his optimal exercise trigger, knowing that selves 1 and 2 will exercise at the triggers, X S,1 and X S,2 , respectively.
Due to self 0's hyperbolic preferences, he will further discount any proceeds from exercise by either selves 1 or 2 by the factor δ.
Let S c 1 (X) denote the continuation value function for self 0, self 0's valuation of the proceeds of exercise occurring after the arrival of self 1. The continuation value function S c 1 (X) has a recursive formulation. If self 1 is alive when his trigger X S,1 is reached, then the option is exercised, and its payoff to self 0 is δ (X S,1 − I). If instead self 2 arrives before X S,1 is reached, than self 0's continuation value evolves into self 1's continuation value, S c 2 (X), where S c 2 (X) = δV (X). Thus S c 1 (X) solves the following differential equation:
where the value-matching condition is given by
Solving gives
Finally, self 0's value function satisfies:
The solution for the value of self 0 is
where self 0's exercise trigger is the solution to the implicit equation
Note that we have X S,0 < X S,1 < X S,2 , and thus each self will exercise at a lower trigger than its future selves. The intuition is clear. Working backwards, self 2 will live forever, so he has time-consistent preferences and will exercise at the time-consistent trigger X * . Self 1, however, faces a different option exercise problem. He knows that if self 2 arrives before he exercises, he will ultimately receive only the fraction δ from exercise. Thus, self 1 has a less valuable option to wait than self 2, since the longer he waits, the greater the chance that self 2 will arrive and provide a lowered payoff. Thus, self 1 exercises earlier than self 2.
Finally, the same story holds for self 0. If self 1 arrives before self 0 exercises, he will receive only the fraction δ of the value of the payoff that self 1 ultimately receives. Thus, self 0 has a lower valued option to wait than self 1, and exercises at a lower trigger.
The Sophisticated Investor with Any Finite Number of Selves
In this subsection, we consider the general case of a sophisticated investor with any finite number of selves. Self 0 is followed by self 1, who is followed by self 2, all the way through self N . Just as in the case of three selves, one can solve the model by backward induction. Given self n + 1 through N 's exercise triggers, self n can formulate his optimal exercise strategy, discounting any future self's exercise proceeds by the additional factor δ.
We will only present an outline of the derivation. A full derivation of the results appears in the appendix. Importantly, we will derive a recursive formula for the value of each self's option along with their optimal exercise trigger. This will also pave the way for the more analytically tractable case of an infinite number of selves.
We solve the problem by working backwards. Self N is the final self, and so he faces the standard time-consistent option exercise problem. Thus, self N 's option value and exercise trigger are given by
respectively, where these formulas are derived in Section 2.3.
The solution for the penultimate self, self N − 1, is also easily obtained. As discussed in the previous subsection, the penultimate sophisticated investor faces the same problem as the naive investor. Thus, self N − 1's option value and exercise trigger are given by
respectively, where these formulas are derived in Section 3.
For n ≤ N − 2, self n's value function and exercise strategy may also be solved by backward induction. Let S n (X) be the value function for self n. Self n takes into account his continuation value function S c n+1 (X), self n's valuation of the proceeds of exercise occurring after the arrival of self (n + 1), and solves the following problem:
In order to solve the differential equation (26), we require a solution for the continuation value function S c n+1 (X). We may write down the recursive structure for the continuation value function S c n+1 (X) as follows:
Note that the recursive relationship starts with the known solutions X S,N −1 = X Naive and
The solutions for the value functions S n (X) and continuation value functions S c n (X) for n = 0, 1, ..., N are presented in the appendix. Most importantly, however, are the optimal exercise triggers chosen by each of the selves. The optimal exercise trigger for self n, satisfies the recursive formula
for n = 0, 1, ..., N − 2, and where the triggers X S,N and X S,N −1 are equal to X * and X Naive , respectively. The constants C n,i are defined in the appendix.
The following proposition demonstrates that each self's trigger value is lower than that of its future self. That is, X S,0 < X S,1 < ... < X S,N . This makes intuitive sense since the time-inconsistency problem will be greater for the earlier selves, as they have a greater number of future selves whose future decisions may detrimentally influence their payoff. The proof appears in the appendix.
Proposition 2 X S , n is increasing in n.
For the case of a finite number of selves, we can now easily prove that the sophisticated investor will exercise earlier than the naive investor, who in turn will invest earlier than the time-consistent investor. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For the sophisticated investor with a finite number of selves with N , X S,0 < X Naive < X * .
Proof For the sophisticated investor, X N = X * , and X N−1 = X Naive . From Proposition 1, X Naive < X * . From Proposition 2, X S,n is increasing in n, and thus X S,0 < X S,N −1 = X Naive . Therefore, we have X S,0 < X Naive < X * .
For the sophisticated investor, each additional future self introduces an extra layer of potentially detrimental exercise behavior from the standpoint of the current self's utility, magnifying the problem of time-inconsistency. In an effort to avoid the detrimental effect of future selves' exercise decisions, the current self finds it optimal to exercise earlier than he otherwise would, in order to lessen the chance of failing to exercise prior to the arrival of his future selves. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 5.
Stationary Solution for the Sophisticated Investor: Countably Infinite Number of Selves
In order to facilitate the intuition of the idea behind time inconsistency and option exercising,
we have previously fixed the number of selves to a finite number. Although we have solved for the investment triggers for the finite N -self model, the solution can be vastly simplified by proceeding to the case of an infinite number of selves. For a fixed number of selves N , we have shown that (i) self N chooses the time-consistent investment trigger X * and (ii) the investment trigger for self n is lower than the investment trigger for self (n + 1). Given the monotonicity of the investment trigger and the fact that all investment triggers are positive, we may conclude that the investment trigger for self 0 converges to the steady-state limiting investment trigger, when the total number of selves, N , goes to infinity. Figure 1 demonstrates how the trigger for the current self (self 0) converges to a steadystate trigger as the number of selves N goes to infinity, given a set of parameter values. For N = 1, the current self trigger is X * , which is 7.32 in this example. For N = 5, the trigger for the current self is 1.69. As one can see, as N increases, the current self trigger converges to a steady-state limiting trigger of 1.67. We may also compute this limiting investment trigger by using the stationary solution found in this subsection. This stationary solution is much more analytically tractable, and its properties mirror those of the finite N case.
When we have infinite number of selves, the sophisticated investor faces the same timeinvariant option exercising problem, for any self n. That is, the sophisticated investor's optimization problem does not depend on n. The stationary solution will involve searching for a fixed-point to the investment exercise problem. Specifically, suppose that all stationary future selves exercise at the trigger X S . Then, X S will represent the (intra-personal) equilibrium investment trigger if the current self's optimal exercise trigger, conditional on the fact that future selves will exercise at X S , is also X S .
Before solving for the intra-personal equilibrium exercise trigger, we consider the current self's exercise strategy conditional on an assumed future self exercise trigger. LetX be a given assumed exercise trigger for future selves. We let the value function be S(X;X), and the continuation value function be S c (X;X). The sophisticated investor thus solves the following option exercising problem:
where Φ(X) is the investor's optimal exercise trigger.
In order to solve the differential equation (31), we also need to solve for the stationary continuation value function S c (X;X). Since all stationary selves exercise at the same trigger, X, the continuation value is simply δ times the present value of receiving the option payof X − I at the triggerX. This solution satisfies the differential equation
The solution for S c (X;X) is
We can now solve for the intra-personal equilibrium sophisticated exercise trigger, X S .
Substitute the solution for S c (X;X) into (31) and (32) , and solve for the value function and exercise trigger S h X;X i and Φ(X), respectively. Then, impose the intra-personal equilibrium condition that all stationary investors exercise at the same trigger: Φ(X S ) = X S .
Define the intra-personal equilibrium value function S(X; X S ) ≡ S(X), we thus obtain the solution of the stationary sophisticated investor problem:
Note that the value of the sophisticated investor's option is equal to a weighted average of two time-consistent present value functions,
the weights are δ and 1 − δ, respectively. Both present value functions represent the value to a time-consistent investor of receiving the exercise payoff of X S − I at the trigger X S , but
where the first present value uses the discount rate ρ and the second uses the discount rate ρ + λ. That is, the sophisticated investor values the exercise payoff as a weighted average of two option values: one for an investor with a discount rate of ρ, and one for an investor with a discount rate of ρ + λ.
The numerator of the sophisticated trigger X S is a weighted average of β 2 and β 1 , with 1 − δ and δ as weights. Similarly, the denominator weightsβ − 1 and β − 1, with 1 − δ and δ, respectively. Obviously, we haveX * < X S < X * ,
where X * = β 1 β 1 −1 I, the exercise trigger chosen by a time-consistent investor with discount rate ρ, andX * = β 2 β 2 −1 I, the exercise trigger chosen by a time-consistent investor with discount rate ρ + λ. That is, the equilibrium trigger strategy must lie in between the trigger for the time-consistent agent with discount rate ρ and the equilibrium trigger strategy for the time-consistent agent with discount rate ρ + λ.
Note that if there is no hyperbolic discounting, and δ = 1, then the time-consistent solution holds where X S = X * . Conversely, if there is extreme hyperbolic discount where δ = 0, then the current agent acts as if his discount rate is ρ + λ, and X S =X * . In between these two extremes we have
Just as in the case of finite N , the sophisticated investor invests earlier than the naive investor. Proposition 4 demonstrates this timing result that is the analog to Proposition 3 for the stationary case.
Proposition 4
The sophisticated investor in the stationary case exercises earlier than the naive investor, who in turn exercises earlier than the time-consistent investor, X S < X Naive < X * .
5 Discussion of Investment Timing: Time-Consistent vs. Naive vs. Sophisticated
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that time-inconsistent entrepreneurs invest earlier than time-consistent entrepreneurs. Moreover, the sophisticated time-inconsistent investor invests even earlier than the naive time-inconsistent investor. In this section we discuss these results and their implications.
The first fundamental result is the precise trade-off between the benefits of waiting to invest and the increased impatience driven by time-inconsistent discounting. In our intertemporal stochastic setting, as is well-known from real options theory, an investor holds a valuable option to wait. This option to wait is what drives the time-consistent investor to exercise when the option is substantially in the money, as embodied by the distance between X * and I. Now, when we introduce the time-varying impatience driven by time-inconsistent preferences, we then have a force that counteracts the benefits of waiting for uncertainty to resolve itself . This counteracting force is caused by the current self's motivation to exercise before the future selves take control of the exercise decision, because the payoff to the current self from future exercise is discounted by the factor δ. Therefore, the lowered value of the option to wait induces time-inconsistent investors to exercise earlier than the time-consistent investor. Since I < X S < X Naive < X * , time inconsistency reduces, but does not eliminate, the option to wait.
The second fundamental result is the distinction between sophisticated and naive investors. Sophisticated investors invest even earlier than naive investors. The intuition is relatively simple. While naive investors are optimistic in that they incorrectly forecast that their future selves will behave according to their current preferences, sophisticated investors correctly forecast that their future selves will invest suboptimally relative to their current preferences. The realistic pessimism of sophisticated investors compels them to invest earlier than naive investors, so as to lessen the probability that future selves will take over the investment decision and invest suboptimally. This result is referred to by O'Donoghue and Rabin For each type of investor, the option value smoothly pastes to the option's payoff value, X −I, at the investor's exercise trigger. For each value of X prior to exercise, the vertical distance between the option value and the payoff value equals the value of the option to wait. Note that at all levels of X prior to exercise, the time-consistent investor has the most valuable option to wait, followed by the naive investor and then the sophisticated investor. For both the naive and sophisticated investors the value of their options to wait are reduced by the fact that the current self only receives a fraction of the option payoff if a future self does the exercising. The value of the option to wait for the sophisticated investor is further reduced due to the fact that its future selves will also exercise at a suboptimal exercise trigger (from the vantage of the current self).
We find it reasonable to believe that entrepreneurs (such as an individual or a small private partnership) are more prone to time-inconsistent behavior than firms. Consistent Commercial real estate markets have historically been prone to pronounced periods of construction, only to be followed by rising vacancies and declining rents at the time construction is completed. 14 
An Extension: Investment in Projects with a Sequence of Future Cash Flows
In this section we consider a seemingly minor alteration to the basic setup. In the basic model we considered the proceeds from investment to be a lump sum payment X(t), minus the investment cost I. In that case, X(t) represented the value of the investment project at time t. Now, suppose that by paying the investment cost I, one receives a flow payment of p(t) forever after. For example, Chapter 5 in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) deals with the case of lump sum investment proceeds, while Chapter 6 deals with projects with perpetual cash flows.
Here, the flow payoff p(t) is assumed to be non-tradable for the same reasons that we assume that the underlying investment opportunity is non-tradable. For example, the payoff flow may be contingent on the unique skills of the entrepreneur, or there may be moral hazard or adverse selections issues that can undermine the selling of the cash flow stream. If we instead assume that the flow payoff p(t) is tradable, then we can simply replace the present value of the flow payoff with a lump sum value, and we are back in the original framework of the basic model in the previous sections of this paper.
In the standard real options framework, the exercise decision is basically unchanged under these two specifications. The time-consistent investor simply discounts the perpetual cash flow at the rate ρ to its lump sum equivalent value, and then exercises using the same trigger as in the lump sum case. However, with hyperbolic discounting, the distinction becomes important, since the hyperbolic discounter must take into account the portion of the flow payment that accrues under future selves. To the time-inconsistent investor, the stream of future cash flows is worth less than it is to the time-consistent investor, since the cash flows that accrue to future selves are discounted by the additional discount factor δ. Importantly, while under the lump sum payment specification the hyperbolic discounter always invests earlier than the geometric discounter, under the cash flow specification the hyperbolic discounter invests always invests later than the geometric discounter.
Let the cash flow process p(t) follow the log-normal process: dp(t) = αp(t)dt + σp(t)dB t .
Following the outlay of the investment cost I, the entrepreneur receives the flow payment p(t) in perpetuity.
The Time-Consistent Investor
As a benchmark, we briefly consider the case in which all cash flows are discounted at the rate ρ. That is, the hyperbolic preference parameter δ is set equal to zero. The present value of the perpetual flow of p(t) is p(t) ρ−α . Let v(p) denote the value of the investment option, where p is the current level of p(t).
v(p) must solve the differential equation:
Equation (39) must be solved subject to the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
The option value, v(p), and the exercise trigger, p * , are
Note that the trigger is essentially identical to that of the lump sum case; the value of the future cash flows at the trigger point is p * ρ−α , which equals X * .
The Sophisticated Investor
Now, consider the case of the sophisticated investor with hyperbolic discounting. For analytical tractability, we analyze the stationary case of an infinite number of selves. However, nothing substantive would change if we instead modeled the finite number of selves case.
Upon paying the investment cost I at exercise, the investor begins receiving the cash flow p(t). However, due to hyperbolic discounting, this payout is discounted by the additional factor δ upon the arrival of the future self. The present value of this cash flow 15 at exercise
Importantly, γ < 1 implies that the value of the payoff from exercise for the hyperbolic discounter is less than that for the time-consistent investor. While the time-consistent investor values the future cash flows as p ρ−α , the hyperbolic discounted values them as γ p ρ−α . In order for the sophisticated investor's problem to make sense in the flow payment setting, we must restrict the parameter region to ensure the existence of an intra-personal equilibrium.
Specifically, it must be the case (in equilibrium) that the current self receives a greater payoff from exercising himself than he would receive from having a future self exercise. In the lump sum payoff case of Section 4.3, this was obvious, since the payoff to the current self was X − I 15 This present value can be expressed as
, where T has an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ, and the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of T and p(t).
if he exercised, while the payoff was δ(X − I) if a future self exercised. In the flow setting it may not always hold, since the payoff to the current self is γ p ρ−α − I if he exercises, and δ( p ρ−α − I) if a future self exercises. For example, if the amount of hyperbolic discounting is very large (i.e., δ is very small), then even though the flow payoff is reduced, the benefits of only having to pay a small fraction of the investment cost, δI, may make the current self better off if the future self invested. If we allow the payoff from allowing a future self to exercise to be greater than if one exercises themselves, then no equilibrium exists. Below, we will impose a condition to ensure the existence of an equilibrium.
As was the case in Section 4.3, the intra-personal equilibrium sophisticated trigger represents the solution to a fixed-point problem. In a stationary intra-personal equilibrium, the current self's optimal exercise trigger, conditional on an assumed trigger for future selves, must be the same as that of future selves. For an assumed trigger of future selves equal tô p, we let the value function be s(p;p), and the continuation value function be s c (p;p). The sophisticated investor thus solves the following option exercising problem:
where ϕ(p) is the sophisticated investor's optimal exercise trigger.
In order to solve the differential equation (44), we also need to solve for the stationary continuation value function s c (p;p). Since all stationary selves exercise at the same trigger, p, the continuation value is simply the value of the perpetual cash flow of δp, after paying the investment cost δI. This continuation value satisfies the differential equation
The solution for the continuation value s c (p;p) is
We can now solve for the intra-personal equilibrium sophisticated exercise trigger, p S .
Substitute the solution for s c (p;p) into (44) and (45), and solve for the value function and exercise trigger s(p;p) and ϕ(p), respectively. Then, impose the equilibrium condition that all stationary investors exercise at the same trigger: ϕ(p S ) = p S . Define the intra-personal equilibrium value function s(p; p S ) ≡ s(p), we thus obtain the solution of the stationary sophisticated investor problem:
As discussed above, in order to ensure that a solution exists, we restrict γ
Proposition 5 demonstrates that for the case of flow payoffs, the sophisticated investor exercises later than the time-consistent investor. The proof appears in the appendix.
Proposition 5 For the case of flow payouts, the sophisticated investor exercises later than the time-consistent investor, p S > p * .
This result is due to the interaction of two conflicting forces. First, as we know from the base case of a lump-sum payoff, hyperbolic discounting increases the desire to exercise earlier, as this allows the agent to protect himself from the "sub-optimal" investing of future selves. Second, with the case of project cash flows, the hyperbolic agent actually receives "lower" cash flows than would a time-consistent agent, as he discounts those flows received by future selves by δ. This is apparent from the γ parameter that enters the payoff value in the boundary conditions. This lowered payoff from exercise motivates the hyperbolic agent to wait longer before exercising, to justify the exercise expense. The second effect dominates the first effect. 16 
The Naive Investor
We now assume that the investor has hyperbolic preferences, but naively assumes that future selves will behave according to his current preferences. Thus, the valuation equation is the same as above in (44), with the exception that the naive investor believes that future selves 16 If instead of using an infinite horizon for the cash flows we moved to a finite horizon T , then we would find for a particular finite horizon the two effects would exactly offset each other. That is, there exists a T * in the flow payment case such that for T = T * the sophisticated and time-consistent invetsors would exercise at the same time. For T < T * the sophisticated investor would exercise earlier than the time-consistent investor, and for T ≥ T * the sophisticated investor would exercise later than the time-consistent investor.
will exercise at the time-consistent trigger p * . Thus, the continuation value for the naive investor is δ
The solution to the naive investor problem is slightly more complicated than that for the sophisticated investor. We will find that there are two regions that must be separately valued: a lower region where the arrival of the future self implies delayed exercise, and a higher region where the arrival of the future self implies immediate exercise. This is due to the fact that the investment trigger for the naive investor is above p * . 17 The value of the hyperbolic investment opportunity to the naive investor, n(p), will equal n L (p) for p < p * and n H (p) for p ≥ p * . That is, the option will have a low region where the continuation value equals δ
The naive investor (his current self) will exercise at the trigger p Naive . We will assume that p Naive > p * , and later verify this conjecture.
For p < p * , the value function for n L (p) satisfies:
The naive investor will not invest in the low region. However, to ensure that n(p) is continuously differentiable at p * , we apply the following two boundary conditions:
The general solution for
For p ≥ p * , the value function for n H (p) satisfies:
subject to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
The general solution for n H (p) is
The solutions for A H , B H , B L , and p Naive are easily obtained numerically.
We can demonstrate analytically that the naive investor will invest later than both the sophisticated and time-consistent investors. That is, p * < p S < p Naive . The proof appears in the appendix.
Proposition 6 For the case of flow payments, p * < p S < p Naive .
As always, the sophisticated investor invests earlier than the naive investor. This "sophistication effect" was discussed in Section 6.4, and results from the greater desire of the sophisticated investor to invest early so as to protect himself against the behavior of future selves. The naive investor is always more optimistic about his future selves' behavior.
Discussion
As demonstrated by Propositions 5 and 6, the case of flow payments provides very different results from the case of a lump sum payoff from investment. The crucial factor is that with perpetual flow payments, hyperbolic investors value the payoff from exercise less than do time-consistent investors, thus increasing the value of their option to wait. While it remains true that hyperbolic investors have an incentive to exercise before their future selves (particularly sophisticated investors), the previously mentioned effect dominates. exercise earlier than the time-inconsistent investors, whose options to wait have greater value due to their lower exercise payoff. In comparing the value of the option to wait between the sophisticated and naive investors, the value of the option to wait for the sophisticated investor is lower due to the fact that its future selves will exercise at a suboptimal exercise trigger (from the vantage of the current self).
Since time-inconsistent investors value the flow payments less than time-consistent investors (due to the γ term), they would certainly prefer to sell the cash flow stream to a time-consistent investor and receive a higher lump sum value. This would transform the problem into that of the earlier sections of the paper, with obviously different implications.
Thus, for this flow payment framework to hold, it must be the case that there are frictions which prevent such a sale.
In Section 5 we used commercial real estate development as an example where timeinconsistent investors might be the holders of such options. This was due to the fact that most commercial real estate development is done by noninstitutional investors. Williams unlikely that the purchaser would be able to achieve the same level of cash flows from the project. For example, just as the original founder of a business was essential to the initial development of the opportunity, the founder may be critical for the operating phase of the business, particularly in the early years.
What Happens When Time-Inconsistent Investors Interact? The Case of Competitive Industry Equilibrium
In this section we model the perfectly competitive equilibrium outcome when the industry is comprised of sophisticated hyperbolic investors. It is a simple equilibrium extension of the flow payment setting of Section 6. The competitive equilibrium framework we use is very similar to that of Leahy (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . The presentation in this section will be fairly brief and heuristic, as a more rigorous discussion can be found in Leahy (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . The important contribution of this section is the extension of the equilibrium to the case of hyperbolic firms.
Consider an industry comprised of a large number of competitive firms. Each firm has the option to undertake a single investment, requiring an up-front investment cost of I. The project yields a price (profit) flow of p(t) forever. 18 The industry is perfectly competitive, in that each unit of output is small in comparison with industry supply, Q(t). Thus, each firm acts as a price taker. The equilibrium price is determined by the condition equating industry supply and demand. Each firm takes as given the stochastic process of price. In the rational expectations equilibrium, this conjectured price process will indeed be the market clearing price.
The price of a unit of output is given by the industry's inverse demand curve
where θ(t) is a multiplicative shock term following the geometric Brownian motion
and where D 0 < 0.
Over an interval of time in which no entry takes place, Q(t) is fixed, and thus p(t) follows the geometric Brownian motion dp(t) = αp(t)dt + σp(t)dB t .
Given the multiplicative shock specification of the demand curve in (58), entry by new firms causes the price process to have an upper reflecting barrier. Thus, in this simple setting, each price taking firm will take the process (60) with an upper reflecting barrier as given.
In the rational expectations equilibrium, the entry response by investors who assume such a process will lead precisely to the supply process that equates supply and demand.
While we solve for the equilibrium comprised of sophisticated investors, we do not construct an equilibrium for the case of naive investors. This is due to the problematic nature of defining an equilibrium for naive investors. While the literature on naive hyperbolic preferences provides a well-defined notion of a current self's expectations regarding future selves' behavior, there is no standard assumption regarding what naive investors forecast for others' current and future selves. For example, do naive investors believe that other investors posses self control, or do they believe that only they themselves possess self control? The implications for either assumption make for a very complex equilibrium.
Equilibrium with Time-Consistent Investors
As a benchmark, consider an industry comprised of time-consistent investors. Conjecture that investors forecast that equilibrium entry will occur at the trigger p * eq , and thus the price process will have an upper reflecting barrier at p * eq . Consider the value of an active firm, one that has already paid the entry cost and is producing output. Denote the value of an active firm as G(p), where G(p) satisfies the equilibrium differential equation:
The impact of the reflecting barrier necessitates the boundary condition 19 :
Similarly, let F (p) denote the value of an inactive firm, its value prior to investing, where F (p) satisfies the equilibrium differential equation:
The inactive firm's investment trigger is determined by value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. Rational expectations ensure that the entry trigger is at the conjectured trigger,
The solution to this equilibrium system is:
for p ≤ p * eq . The equilibrium is clearly very intuitive. Free entry ensures that the value of an inactive firm is zero. The value of an active firm is equal to the present value of future cash flows, where the reflecting barrier ensures that the value of an active firm at entry is equal to the cost of entry, G(p * eq ) = I. Finally, as has been demonstrated by Leahy (1993) and others, the exercise trigger for a perfectly competitive industry equals the monopolist trigger p * . The intuition is that the reflecting barrier has two exactly opposing effects: it lowers the value of the proceeds from exercise (since the future cash flow is capped at the barrier), while it also lowers the option value of waiting. 19 See Malliaris and Brock (1982, p. 200 ).
Equilibrium with Sophisticated Investors
Now, consider the equilibrium when the industry is comprised of sophisticated investors with hyperbolic preferences. Conjecture that investors forecast that equilibrium entry will occur at the trigger p eq , and thus the price process will have an upper reflecting barrier at p eq . Consider the value of an active firm, one that has already paid the entry cost and is producing output. Denote the value of an active firm as g(p), where g(p) satisfies the equilibrium differential equation:
and g c (p) is the continuation value, to be derived below. The impact of the reflecting barrier necessitates the boundary condition:
comprised of time-consistent investors will have more rapid growth than industries comprised of sophisticated hyperbolic investors. A proof appears in the appendix.
Proposition 7
The competitive equilibrium trigger p eq for sophisticated agents with hyperbolic preferences is greater than the competitive equilibrium trigger p * eq for agents with timeconsistent preferences.
Given that in the flow payment case the monopoly trigger for the sophisticated agent is greater than that for the time-consistent investor, it is not surprising that sophisticated agents also procrastinate more than time-consistent investors in equilibrium. Sophisticated investors must discount the flow payments from entry received by future selves by δ, reducing their exercise payout and thus increasing the value of their option to wait.
While in the time-consistent equilibrium it is the case that the monopoly and competitive equilibrium triggers coincide (that is, p * eq = p * ), this is not the case for sophisticated agents. In the following proposition we demonstrate that the sophisticated equilibrium trigger is below the sophisticated monopoly trigger. A proof appears in the appendix. This is an interesting result, since it demonstrates that a standard result in real options does not survive the extension to time-inconsistent investors. The key reason for this is due to the fact that in equilibrium, the time-inconsistent investor competes both interpersonally (against competitors) and intrapersonally (against future selves), while the time-consistent investor competes only interpersonally.
Proposition 8
The competitive equilibrium trigger p eq for sophisticated agents is lower than the monopoly trigger p S for sophisticated agents.
The intuition for this result is as follows. As in Leahy (1993) , with time-consistent agents, competitive equilibrium introduces two offsetting changes to the monopoly investor problem.
First, equilibrium competition places an upper bound on cash flows (through the reflecting barrier). This effect, taken by itself, makes exercise less valuable and pushes the equilibrium entry trigger above the monopoly trigger. Second, the free-entry condition of equilibrium eliminates the value of the option to wait. This effect, taken by itself, pushes the equilibrium entry trigger below the monopoly trigger. For the case of time-consistent agents, these two effects precisely cancel each other out, leading to an equilibrium trigger equal to the monopoly trigger. Now, with the sophisticated time-inconsistent agent, the second effect dominates.
Recall that in the flow payment case, the value of the sophisticated investor's option to wait is greater than that for the time-consistent investor due to the increased discounting of future cash flows. Therefore, the impact of the free-entry condition's elimination of the option to wait has a greater impact for the sophisticated investor, leading the equilibrium trigger to be below that of the monopoly trigger.
Conclusion
This paper extends the real options framework to account for time-inconsistent preferences.
Entrepreneurs must formulate their investment decisions taking into account their beliefs about the behavior of their future selves. This sets up a conflict between two opposing forces: the desire to take advantage of the option to wait, and the desire to invest early to avoid allowing future selves to take over the investment decision. We find that the precise trade-off between these two forces depends on such factors as whether investors are sophisticated or naive about their future time-inconsistent behavior, as well as whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time. We extend the model to consider equilibrium investment behavior for an industry comprised of time-inconsistent entrepreneurs. Equilibrium involves the dual problem of agents playing dynamic games against others as well as against their own future selves. Finally, the equilibrium could be further extended to account for industries made up of both time-consistent and time-inconsistent investors.
Appendices

A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Define
We are searching for a fixed point of this function, X Naive .
Note that f (0) = β 2 β 2 −1 I > 0, and
Thus, the function f ( · ) is increasing. Moreover,
Therefore, since f (0) > 0, f (X * ) > X * , and f 0 > 0, there exists an X Naive < X * such that f (X Naive ) = X Naive .
Proof of Proposition 2. We use the method of mathematical induction. It is straightforward to verify that the investment trigger, continuation value function and value function are smaller for self N − 1 than for self N , in that
Suppose X S,n < X S,n+1 , S c n (X) < S c n+1 (X) and S n (X) < S n+1 (X) hold for some 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. If we can show that X S,n−1 < X S,n , S c n−1 (X) < S c n (X) and S n−1 (X) < S n (X) hold for the same n, then we have completed the proof.
Consider the differential equation and boundary conditions for the value function S n (X) in (26) and (27) . It can be envisioned as an asset with a discount rate of ρ + λ, a dividend flow payment of λS c n+1 (X), and an ending payout of X − I at the first passage time to a trigger value determined by the smooth-pasting optimality condition. Note, this asset is an option that promises a dividend payout while unexercised. A similar characterization can be made for the value function S n−1 (X). The only difference is that the dividend flow payment for S n−1 (X) is λS c n (X), which is lower than λS c n+1 (X) by the assumption. Now, if you have two identical options with the exception that one has a higher dividend payment while unexercised, then you will certainly exercise the option with the lower dividend payment first.
Thus, X S,n−1 < X S,n . Similarly, the value of the option with the lower dividend payment will be lower, S n−1 (X) < S n (X). Now, consider the differential equation and boundary condition for the continuation value function S c n (X) in (28) and (29) . It can be envisioned as an asset with a discount rate of ρ + λ, a dividend flow payment of λS c n+1 (X), and an ending payout of δ (X S,n − I) at the first moment the trigger value X S,n is reached. This is very similar to the payouts for asset S n (X): it has the same dividend flow, but a final payout that is discounted by δ. We can express the asset S c n (X) as δ times the asset S n (X), plus the present value of the dividend flow (1 − δ)λS c n+1 (X) until the time trigger X S,n is reached. Similarly, we can express the asset S c n−1 (X)as δ times the asset S n−1 (X), plus the present value of the dividend flow (1 − δ)λS c n (X) until the time trigger X S,n−1 is reached. From this decomposition, we can see that asset S c n (X) dominates asset S c n−1 (X). First, we have shown above that δS n (X) > δS n−1 (X). Second, by assumption we have that S c n+1 (X) > S c n (X) and X S,n+1 > X S,n , the present value of receiving (1 − δ)λS c n+1 (X) until the trigger X S,n+1 is reached is greater than the present value of receiving (1 − δ)λS c n (X) until the trigger X S,n is reached. Thus, S c n (X) > S c n−1 (X).
for a ≤ X * . Also note that
where the first inequality follows from a ≤ X * . Note that f xx (x; a) > 0 for x ≤ a. Together with f x (a; a) < 0, we have f x (x; a) < 0 for x ≤ a. Thus, by the implicit function theorem, we
Since X * > X S , we thus have X Naive > X S .
Proof of Proposition 5. To show p S > p * , it is equivalent to show
The above can be written as the following inequality: Thus, taking the derivative gives The first and second equations of (A.17) imply
(A.18)
The third and fourth equations of (A.17) imply where we make the dependence of β 1 on ρ explicit. Note that β 2 is equal to the function β 1 evaluated at ρ + λ.
Thus, it is equivalent to show dk(ρ) dρ < 0. Define the linear functions
From (A.18) and (A. 19) we have h(p * ) = k 1 (p * ), and h(p Naive ) = k 2 (p Naive ). Also, the unique root solving k 1 (p) = k 2 (p) is p S .
We have the following properties of k 1 (p) and k 2 (p) :
Define w(p) = h(p) − k 1 (p). We know that w(0) = ∞, w(p * ) = 0, w(∞) < 0, and w 00 (p) > 0. Thus, p * must be a unique root of w(p). This implies that the graph of h(p) must be tangent to the line of k 1 (p) at their point of intersection, p * .
Using the properties of the curve h and the lines k 1 and k 2 , we can see graphically (see Figure 4 ) that the tangency point p * must be to the left of the point where k 1 intersects k 2 , since Proposition 5 demonstrates that p * < p S . p Naive must be greater than p S as h(p) will intersect k 2 at a point to the right of p S . Therefore, p * < p S < p Naive .
Proof of Proposition 7. The inequality p eq > p * eq can be written as We first verify the recursion for the continuation value function S c n+1 (X) and then the recursion for the value function S c n (X) for consecutive selves.
• Solve for the continuation value function S c n+1 (X)
Consider self n's continuation value function S c n+1 (X). For notational convenience, let n = N − (j + 1). We conjecture that S c n+1 (X) = S c N−j (X) is given by and X Naive is the investment trigger by the naive agent given in (11) . §2 We next derive the recursive relationship from the continuation value function S c N−(j−1) (X) for self (N − j) to the continuation value function S c N−j (X) for self (N − (j + 1)).
Plugging the candidate value function and its first two derivatives into the valuation equation (28) This is to which we now turn.
Finally, we solve G N−(j+1),0 and X N −(j+1) by using the value-matching and smoothpasting conditions for the value function. The investment trigger for self n is given in (30) and 
